RRSIG validation back to the root

README.md

@@ -20,16 +20,28 @@ ground up.
 
 # Status:
 
-WARNING!!! Under active development!
+Using the client should be safe. The client is currently hardcoded to a 5 second,
-
+timeout. I'll make this configurable if people ask for that, but this allows me
-The client now supports timeouts (thanks mio!). Currently hardcoded to 5 seconds,
+to move on. Please send feedback! It currently does not cache responses, if
- I'll make this configurable if people ask for that, but this allows me to move on.
+this is a feature you'd like earlier rather than later, post a request. The
+validation of DNSSec is complete, but negative responses are not yet.
+The plan is to support NSEC3 primarily, but allow NSEC records to be validated.
 
 The server code is complete, the daemon supports IPv4 and IPv6, UDP and TCP.
 There currently is no way to limit TCP and AXFR operations, so it is still not
 recommended to put into production as TCP can be used to DOS the service.
 Master file parsing is complete and supported. There is currently no forking
-option, and the server is not yet threaded.
+option, and the server is not yet threaded. There is still a lot of work to do
+before a server can be trusted with this externally. Running it behind a firewall
+on a private network would be safe.
+
+## DNSSec status
+
+Currently the root key is hardcoded into the system. This gives validation of
+DNSKEY and DS records back to the root. NSEC and NSEC3 are not yet implemented.
+Because caching is not yet enabled, it has been noticed that some DNS servers
+appear to rate limit the connections, validating RRSIG records back to the root
+can require a significant number of additional queries for those records.
 
 ## RFC's implemented
 
@@ -42,6 +54,15 @@ option, and the server is not yet threaded.
 ### Update operations
 - [RFC 2136](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2136): Dynamic Update
 
+### Secure DNS operations
+- [RFC 3007](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3007): Secure Dynamic Update
+- [RFC 4034](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034): DNSSEC Resource Records
+- [RFC 4035](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035): Protocol Modifications for DNSSEC
+- [RFC 4509](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4509): SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
+- [RFC 5702](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5702): SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG for DNSSEC
+- [RFC 6840](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840): Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSEC
+- [RFC 6944](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6944): DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status
+
 ## RFC's in progress or not yet implemented
 
 ### Basic operations
@@ -55,14 +76,7 @@ option, and the server is not yet threaded.
 - [Long-Lived Queries](http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sekar-dns-llq-01): Notify with bells
 
 ### Secure DNS operations
-- [RFC 3007](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3007): Secure Dynamic Update
-- [RFC 4034](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034): DNSSEC Resource Records
-- [RFC 4035](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035): Protocol Modifications for DNSSEC
-- [RFC 4509](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4509): SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
 - [RFC 5155](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5155): DNSSEC Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
-- [RFC 5702](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5702): SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG for DNSSEC
-- [RFC 6840](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840): Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSEC
-- [RFC 6944](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6944): DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status
 - [RFC 6975](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6975): Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding
 - [DNSCrypt](https://dnscrypt.org): Trusted DNS queries
 - [S/MIME](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-smime-09): Domain Names For S/MIME

root_key.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+openssl req -text -noout -verify -in Kjqmt7v.csr -inform DER -pubkey -out src/rr/dnssec/Kjqmt7v.pem

src/rr/dnssec/Kjqmt7v.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqAAgqVVmukLohruATNqE
+5H71bb167GEmFVUs7JBtIRbQ7yBwKMUVVBRN/q/nx8uPAF3RgjQTOsBxCoEYLOH9
+FK0ig7yDQ1+d8vYxMlGTGhdt8NpR5U9C5gSGDfs1lYAlD1WcxUPE/9Ucvj3oz9Bn
+GSN/n8R+5ynaBoNfpFLoJemhjrwuy89WNHRlLDPPVqkDO8312XMSF5fsgIkEG24D
+obctCnNbmE4DaHMJMyMk8nwtuoXp2xXoOgFDOC6XSwYhwY5iXs7JB1d9nnut6VJB
+qB676KkB1NMnbkCxFMCi5vw40ZwuaqsCZEsoE/V1/CFgHg3uSc2e6WpDED5STWKH
+PQIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+Certificate Request:
+    Data:
+        Version: 0 (0x0)
+        Subject: O=ICANN, OU=IANA, CN=Root Zone KSK 2010-06-16T21:19:24+00:00/1.3.6.1.4.1.1000.53=. IN DS 19036 8 2 49AAC11D7B6F6446702E54A1607371607A1A41855200FD2CE1CDDE32F24E8FB5
+        Subject Public Key Info:
+            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
+                Modulus:
+                    00:a8:00:20:a9:55:66:ba:42:e8:86:bb:80:4c:da:
+                    84:e4:7e:f5:6d:bd:7a:ec:61:26:15:55:2c:ec:90:
+                    6d:21:16:d0:ef:20:70:28:c5:15:54:14:4d:fe:af:
+                    e7:c7:cb:8f:00:5d:d1:82:34:13:3a:c0:71:0a:81:
+                    18:2c:e1:fd:14:ad:22:83:bc:83:43:5f:9d:f2:f6:
+                    31:32:51:93:1a:17:6d:f0:da:51:e5:4f:42:e6:04:
+                    86:0d:fb:35:95:80:25:0f:55:9c:c5:43:c4:ff:d5:
+                    1c:be:3d:e8:cf:d0:67:19:23:7f:9f:c4:7e:e7:29:
+                    da:06:83:5f:a4:52:e8:25:e9:a1:8e:bc:2e:cb:cf:
+                    56:34:74:65:2c:33:cf:56:a9:03:3b:cd:f5:d9:73:
+                    12:17:97:ec:80:89:04:1b:6e:03:a1:b7:2d:0a:73:
+                    5b:98:4e:03:68:73:09:33:23:24:f2:7c:2d:ba:85:
+                    e9:db:15:e8:3a:01:43:38:2e:97:4b:06:21:c1:8e:
+                    62:5e:ce:c9:07:57:7d:9e:7b:ad:e9:52:41:a8:1e:
+                    bb:e8:a9:01:d4:d3:27:6e:40:b1:14:c0:a2:e6:fc:
+                    38:d1:9c:2e:6a:ab:02:64:4b:28:13:f5:75:fc:21:
+                    60:1e:0d:ee:49:cd:9e:e9:6a:43:10:3e:52:4d:62:
+                    87:3d
+                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+        Attributes:
+            a0:00
+    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
+         10:92:6a:79:8f:e9:e4:90:86:8c:d0:51:ac:2d:c9:9f:53:d3:
+         3a:79:e9:15:e8:ca:26:de:08:bd:d2:cd:83:da:ac:d3:e6:bc:
+         54:8b:f9:09:d9:27:b1:6a:ec:fa:b4:7a:4a:f6:97:80:a4:25:
+         80:b6:55:b2:1c:6a:a7:8f:5d:21:a8:57:ad:2e:bd:c9:37:50:
+         70:b7:8b:e0:1b:60:ed:a4:83:0d:d4:d6:13:0f:c9:cb:0a:8f:
+         76:80:eb:23:6f:01:0f:ba:09:20:2b:79:57:e1:18:8f:9a:dc:
+         72:18:6d:76:84:e7:71:72:f1:49:d7:ac:15:2a:51:27:e9:b4:
+         cd:47:ae:18:36:21:fc:88:d6:78:1e:3d:95:eb:81:d4:ad:24:
+         f7:cc:87:d0:73:91:41:f2:44:cd:a3:35:20:0a:07:a4:f0:de:
+         10:04:de:24:b7:9e:1d:1c:24:0a:ee:ca:71:da:ff:2c:f6:4f:
+         c3:f8:0f:57:6d:33:cb:8b:c1:45:73:8f:bb:f9:4c:71:0f:80:
+         c9:b8:15:51:51:17:03:fb:9b:b2:ea:ec:ae:31:a3:ce:0e:7b:
+         c9:d6:ac:65:b9:ec:8e:90:c8:94:e3:37:30:eb:fc:7f:cf:3a:
+         fd:59:7a:d7:7c:9e:0e:01:79:4e:52:0b:78:00:6f:fd:08:eb:
+         8c:56:1c:8f

src/rr/dnssec/algorithm.rs

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  */
 use openssl::crypto::pkey::{PKey, Role};
 use openssl::crypto::rsa::RSA;
-use openssl::crypto::hash;
 use openssl::bn::BigNum;
 
 use ::rr::dnssec::DigestType;

src/rr/dnssec/mod.rs

@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ mod digest_type;
 mod nsec3;
 mod signer;
 mod supported_algorithm;
+mod trust_anchor;
 
 pub use self::algorithm::Algorithm;
 pub use self::digest_type::DigestType;
 pub use self::nsec3::Nsec3HashAlgorithm;
 pub use self::signer::Signer;
 pub use self::supported_algorithm::SupportedAlgorithms;
+pub use self::trust_anchor::TrustAnchor;

src/rr/dnssec/trust_anchor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Benjamin Fry <benjaminfry@me.com>
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+use openssl::crypto::pkey::{PKey, Role};
+
+use ::rr::dnssec::Algorithm;
+
+const ROOT_ANCHOR: &'static str = include_str!("Kjqmt7v.pem");
+
+pub struct TrustAnchor {
+  pkey: Vec<u8>
+}
+
+impl TrustAnchor {
+  pub fn new() -> TrustAnchor {
+    let mut cursor = Cursor::new(ROOT_ANCHOR);
+    let pkey = PKey::public_key_from_pem(&mut cursor).expect("Error parsing Kjqmt7v.pem");
+    let alg = Algorithm::RSASHA256;
+
+    TrustAnchor{ pkey: alg.public_key_to_vec(&pkey) }
+  }
+
+  pub fn contains(&self, other_key: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    self.pkey == other_key
+  }
+}

src/udp/client.rs

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ use openssl::crypto::pkey::Role;
 use ::error::*;
 use ::rr::{DNSClass, RecordType, Record, RData};
 use ::rr::domain;
-use ::rr::dnssec::Signer;
+use ::rr::dnssec::{Signer, TrustAnchor};
 use ::op::{ Message, MessageType, OpCode, Query, Edns, ResponseCode };
 use ::serialize::binary::*;
 
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
     //  the RRSIG is signed by the DNSKEY, the DNSKEY is signed by the DS record in the Parent
     //  zone. The key_tag is the DS record is assigned to the DNSKEY.
     let record_response = try!(self.inner_query(name, query_class, query_type, true));
+    {
       let rrsigs: Vec<&Record> = record_response.get_answers().iter().filter(|rr| rr.get_rr_type() == RecordType::RRSIG).collect();
 
       if rrsigs.is_empty() {
@@ -95,18 +96,20 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
         //  the '.' DNSKEY is signed by the well known root certificate.
         // TODO fix rrsigs clone()
         let proof = try!(self.recursive_query_verify(&name, rrset, rrsigs.clone(), query_type, query_class));
+
+        // TODO return this, also make a prettier print
         debug!("proved existance through: {:?}", proof);
       }
+    }
 
-    // verify each RRSIG...
+    // getting here means that we looped through all records with validation
-    unimplemented!()
+    Ok(record_response)
   }
 
   /// Verifies a record set against the supplied signatures, looking up the DNSKey chain.
   /// returns the chain of proof or an error if there is none.
   fn recursive_query_verify(&self, name: &domain::Name, rrset: Vec<&Record>, rrsigs: Vec<&Record>,
     query_type: RecordType, query_class: DNSClass) -> ClientResult<Vec<Record>> {
-    debug!("verifying: {} type: {:?}", name, query_type);
 
     // TODO: this is ugly, what reference do I want?
     let rrset: Vec<Record> = rrset.iter().map(|rr|rr.clone()).cloned().collect();
@@ -119,6 +122,7 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
           //  but how do you know which needs to be validated with the DS in the parent zone?
           if zone_key && secure_entry_point {
             let mut proof = try!(self.verify_dnskey(record));
+            // TODO: this is verified, it can be cached
             proof.push(record.clone());
             return Ok(proof);
           }
@@ -138,26 +142,26 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
 
         for dnskey in key_rrset.iter() {
           if let &RData::DNSKEY{zone_key, algorithm, revoke, ref public_key, ..} = dnskey.get_rdata() {
-            if revoke { debug!("revoked"); continue } // TODO: does this need to be validated? RFC 5011
+            if revoke { debug!("revoked: {}", dnskey.get_name()); continue } // TODO: does this need to be validated? RFC 5011
-            if !zone_key { debug!("not a zone_key, can't use"); continue }
+            if !zone_key { continue }
-            if algorithm != sig_alg { debug!("algorithms don't match"); continue }
+            if algorithm != sig_alg { continue }
 
             let pkey = try!(algorithm.public_key_from_vec(public_key));
-            if !pkey.can(Role::Verify) { debug!("pkey can't verify"); continue }
+            if !pkey.can(Role::Verify) { debug!("pkey can't verify, {:?}", dnskey.get_name()); continue }
 
             let signer: Signer = Signer::new(algorithm, pkey, signer_name.clone());
             let rrset_hash: Vec<u8> = signer.hash_rrset(rrsig, &rrset);
 
             if signer.verify(&rrset_hash, sig) {
-              debug!("verified: {} with: {}", name, dnskey.get_name());
-
               if signer_name == name && query_type == RecordType::DNSKEY {
                 // this is self signed... let's skip to DS validation
                 let mut proof: Vec<Record> = try!(self.verify_dnskey(dnskey));
+                // TODO: this is verified, cache it
                 proof.push((*dnskey).clone());
                 return Ok(proof);
               } else {
                 let mut proof = try!(self.recursive_query_verify(&signer_name, key_rrset.clone(), key_rrsigs, RecordType::DNSKEY, query_class));
+                // TODO: this is verified, cache it
                 proof.push((*dnskey).clone());
                 return Ok(proof);
               }
@@ -179,9 +183,16 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
   /// attempts to verify the DNSKey against the DS of the parent.
   /// returns the chain of proof or an error if there is none.
   fn verify_dnskey(&self, dnskey: &Record) -> ClientResult<Vec<Record>> {
-    debug!("verifying dnskey");
     let name: &domain::Name = dnskey.get_name();
 
+    if dnskey.get_name().is_root() {
+      if let &RData::DNSKEY{ ref public_key, .. } = dnskey.get_rdata() {
+        if TrustAnchor::new().contains(public_key) {
+          return Ok(vec![dnskey.clone()])
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
     let ds_response = try!(self.inner_query(&name, dnskey.get_dns_class(), RecordType::DS, true));
     let ds_rrset: Vec<&Record> = ds_response.get_answers().iter().filter(|rr| rr.get_rr_type() == RecordType::DS).collect();
     let ds_rrsigs: Vec<&Record> = ds_response.get_answers().iter().filter(|rr| rr.get_rr_type() == RecordType::RRSIG).collect();
@@ -217,7 +228,9 @@ impl<A: ToSocketAddrs + Copy> Client<A> {
         let hash: Vec<u8> = digest_type.hash(&buf);
         if &hash == digest {
           // continue to verify the chain...
-          return self.recursive_query_verify(&name, ds_rrset.clone(), ds_rrsigs, RecordType::DNSKEY, dnskey.get_dns_class());
+          let mut proof: Vec<Record> = try!(self.recursive_query_verify(&name, ds_rrset.clone(), ds_rrsigs, RecordType::DNSKEY, dnskey.get_dns_class()));
+          proof.push(dnskey.clone());
+          return Ok(proof)
         }
       } else {
         panic!("expected DS: {:?}", ds.get_rr_type());
@@ -488,36 +501,36 @@ fn test_secure_query_example() {
   }
 }
 
-// TODO: use this site for verifying nsec3
+// // TODO: use this site for verifying nsec3
-#[test]
+// #[test]
-#[cfg(feature = "ftest")]
+// #[cfg(feature = "ftest")]
-fn test_secure_query_sdsmt() {
+// fn test_secure_query_sdsmt() {
-  use std::net::*;
+//   use std::net::*;
-
+//
-  use ::rr::dns_class::DNSClass;
+//   use ::rr::dns_class::DNSClass;
-  use ::rr::record_type::RecordType;
+//   use ::rr::record_type::RecordType;
-  use ::rr::domain;
+//   use ::rr::domain;
-  use ::rr::record_data::RData;
+//   use ::rr::record_data::RData;
-  use ::udp::Client;
+//   use ::udp::Client;
-
+//
-  let name = domain::Name::with_labels(vec!["www".to_string(), "sdsmt".to_string(), "edu".to_string()]);
+//   let name = domain::Name::with_labels(vec!["www".to_string(), "sdsmt".to_string(), "edu".to_string()]);
-  let client = Client::new(("8.8.8.8").parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
+//   let client = Client::new(("8.8.8.8").parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
-
+//
-  let response = client.secure_query(&name, DNSClass::IN, RecordType::A);
+//   let response = client.secure_query(&name, DNSClass::IN, RecordType::A);
-  assert!(response.is_ok(), "query failed: {}", response.unwrap_err());
+//   assert!(response.is_ok(), "query failed: {}", response.unwrap_err());
-
+//
-  let response = response.unwrap();
+//   let response = response.unwrap();
-
+//
-  println!("response records: {:?}", response);
+//   println!("response records: {:?}", response);
-
+//
-  let record = &response.get_answers()[0];
+//   let record = &response.get_answers()[0];
-  assert_eq!(record.get_name(), &name);
+//   assert_eq!(record.get_name(), &name);
-  assert_eq!(record.get_rr_type(), RecordType::A);
+//   assert_eq!(record.get_rr_type(), RecordType::A);
-  assert_eq!(record.get_dns_class(), DNSClass::IN);
+//   assert_eq!(record.get_dns_class(), DNSClass::IN);
-
+//
-  if let &RData::A{ ref address } = record.get_rdata() {
+//   if let &RData::A{ ref address } = record.get_rdata() {
-    assert_eq!(address, &Ipv4Addr::new(93,184,216,34))
+//     assert_eq!(address, &Ipv4Addr::new(93,184,216,34))
-  } else {
+//   } else {
-    assert!(false);
+//     assert!(false);
-  }
+//   }
-}
+// }