refactor: hosts/modules/work: split tailscale into own file

hosts/modules/roles/work/default.nix

@@ -8,67 +8,11 @@
     '';
   };
 
+  imports = [
+    ./tailscale.nix
+  ];
+
   config = lib.mkIf config.sane.roles.work {
-    ### TAILSCALE
-    # first run:
-    # - `sudo tailscale login --hostname $myHostname`
-    sane.persist.sys.byStore.private = [
-      { user = "root"; group = "root"; mode = "0700"; path = "/var/lib/tailscale"; method = "bind"; }
-    ];
-    services.tailscale.enable = true;
-    # services.tailscale.useRoutingFeatures = "client";
-    services.tailscale.extraSetFlags = [
-      "--accept-routes"
-      # "--operator=colin"  #< this *should* allow non-root control, but fails: <https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/16080>
-    ];
-    services.tailscale.extraDaemonFlags = [
-      "-verbose" "7"
-    ];
-    services.bind.extraConfig = ''
-      include "${config.sops.secrets."tailscale-work-zones-bind.conf".path}";
-    '';
-    systemd.services.tailscaled = {
-      # systemd hardening (systemd-analyze security tailscaled.service)
-      serviceConfig.AmbientCapabilities = "CAP_NET_ADMIN";
-      serviceConfig.CapabilityBoundingSet = "CAP_NET_ADMIN";
-      serviceConfig.LockPersonality = true;
-      serviceConfig.MemoryDenyWriteExecute = true;
-      serviceConfig.NoNewPrivileges = true;
-
-      serviceConfig.ProtectClock = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectControlGroups = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectHome = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectHostname = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelLogs = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelModules = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelTunables = true;
-      serviceConfig.ProtectProc = "invisible";
-      serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = "strict";  # makes read-only: all but /dev, /proc, /sys.
-      serviceConfig.ProcSubset = "pid";
-
-      # serviceConfig.PrivateIPC = true;
-      serviceConfig.PrivateTmp = true;
-
-      # serviceConfig.RemoveIPC = true;  #< does not apply to root
-      serviceConfig.RestrictAddressFamilies = "AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_NETLINK AF_UNIX";
-      # #VVV this includes anything it reads from, e.g. /bin/sh; /nix/store/...
-      # # see `systemd-analyze filesystems` for a full list
-      serviceConfig.RestrictFileSystems = "@application @basic-api @common-block";
-      serviceConfig.RestrictRealtime = true;
-      serviceConfig.RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
-      serviceConfig.SystemCallArchitectures = "native";
-      serviceConfig.SystemCallFilter = [
-        "@system-service"
-        "@sandbox"
-        "~@chown"
-        "~@cpu-emulation"
-        "~@keyring"
-      ];
-      serviceConfig.DevicePolicy = "closed";  # only allow /dev/{null,zero,full,random,urandom}
-      serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = "/dev/net/tun";  #< TODO: enable "userspace networking" tailscale option, to remove this?
-      serviceConfig.RestrictNamespaces = true;
-    };
-
     sane.programs.guiApps.suggestedPrograms = [
       "slack"
       "zoom-us"

hosts/modules/roles/work/tailscale.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# first run:
+# - `sudo tailscale login --hostname $myHostname`
+{ config, lib, ... }:
+{
+  config = lib.mkIf config.sane.roles.work {
+    sane.persist.sys.byStore.private = [
+      { user = "root"; group = "root"; mode = "0700"; path = "/var/lib/tailscale"; method = "bind"; }
+    ];
+    services.tailscale.enable = true;
+    # services.tailscale.useRoutingFeatures = "client";
+    services.tailscale.extraSetFlags = [
+      "--accept-routes"
+      # "--operator=colin"  #< this *should* allow non-root control, but fails: <https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/16080>
+    ];
+    services.tailscale.extraDaemonFlags = [
+      "-verbose" "7"
+    ];
+    services.bind.extraConfig = ''
+      include "${config.sops.secrets."tailscale-work-zones-bind.conf".path}";
+    '';
+    systemd.services.tailscaled = {
+      # systemd hardening (systemd-analyze security tailscaled.service)
+      serviceConfig.AmbientCapabilities = "CAP_NET_ADMIN";
+      serviceConfig.CapabilityBoundingSet = "CAP_NET_ADMIN";
+      serviceConfig.LockPersonality = true;
+      serviceConfig.MemoryDenyWriteExecute = true;
+      serviceConfig.NoNewPrivileges = true;
+
+      serviceConfig.ProtectClock = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectControlGroups = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectHome = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectHostname = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelLogs = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelModules = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectKernelTunables = true;
+      serviceConfig.ProtectProc = "invisible";
+      serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = "strict";  # makes read-only: all but /dev, /proc, /sys.
+      serviceConfig.ProcSubset = "pid";
+
+      # serviceConfig.PrivateIPC = true;
+      serviceConfig.PrivateTmp = true;
+
+      # serviceConfig.RemoveIPC = true;  #< does not apply to root
+      serviceConfig.RestrictAddressFamilies = "AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_NETLINK AF_UNIX";
+      # #VVV this includes anything it reads from, e.g. /bin/sh; /nix/store/...
+      # # see `systemd-analyze filesystems` for a full list
+      serviceConfig.RestrictFileSystems = "@application @basic-api @common-block";
+      serviceConfig.RestrictRealtime = true;
+      serviceConfig.RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
+      serviceConfig.SystemCallArchitectures = "native";
+      serviceConfig.SystemCallFilter = [
+        "@system-service"
+        "@sandbox"
+        "~@chown"
+        "~@cpu-emulation"
+        "~@keyring"
+      ];
+      serviceConfig.DevicePolicy = "closed";  # only allow /dev/{null,zero,full,random,urandom}
+      serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = "/dev/net/tun";  #< TODO: enable "userspace networking" tailscale option, to remove this?
+      serviceConfig.RestrictNamespaces = true;
+    };
+  };
+}