nix-files/hosts/common/net/networkmanager.nix

269 lines
12 KiB
Nix

{ config, pkgs, ... }:
let
# networkmanager = pkgs.networkmanager;
networkmanager = pkgs.networkmanager.overrideAttrs (upstream: {
src = pkgs.fetchFromGitea {
domain = "git.uninsane.org";
owner = "colin";
repo = "NetworkManager";
# patched to fix polkit permissions (with `nmcli`) when NetworkManager runs as user networkmanager
rev = "dev-sane-1.48.0";
hash = "sha256-vGmOKtwVItxjYioZJlb1og3K6u9s4rcmDnjAPLBC3ao=";
};
# patches = [];
});
# split the package into `daemon` and `nmcli` outputs, because the networkmanager *service*
# doesn't need `nmcli`/`nmtui` tooling
networkmanager-split = pkgs.networkmanager-split.override { inherit networkmanager; };
in {
networking.networkmanager.enable = true;
# plugins mostly add support for establishing different VPN connections.
# the default plugin set includes mostly proprietary VPNs:
# - fortisslvpn (Fortinet)
# - iodine (DNS tunnels)
# - l2tp
# - openconnect (Cisco Anyconnect / Juniper / ocserv)
# - openvpn
# - vpnc (Cisco VPN)
# - sstp
#
# i don't use these, and notably they drag in huge dependency sets and don't cross compile well.
# e.g. openconnect drags in webkitgtk (for SSO)!
# networking.networkmanager.plugins = lib.mkForce [];
networking.networkmanager.enableDefaultPlugins = false;
networking.networkmanager.package = networkmanager-split.daemon.overrideAttrs (upstream: {
# postPatch = (upstream.postPatch or "") + ''
# substituteInPlace src/{core/org.freedesktop.NetworkManager,nm-dispatcher/nm-dispatcher}.conf --replace-fail \
# 'user="root"' 'user="networkmanager"'
# '';
postInstall = (upstream.postInstall or "") + ''
# allow the bus to owned by either root or networkmanager users
# use the group here, that way ordinary users can be elevated to control networkmanager
# (via e.g. `nmcli`)
for f in org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.conf nm-dispatcher.conf ; do
substitute $out/share/dbus-1/system.d/$f \
$out/share/dbus-1/system.d/networkmanager-$f \
--replace-fail 'user="root"' 'group="networkmanager"'
done
# remove unused services to prevent any unexpected interactions
rm $out/etc/systemd/system/{nm-cloud-setup.service,nm-cloud-setup.timer,nm-priv-helper.service}
'';
});
# fixup the services to run as `networkmanager` and with less permissions
systemd.services.NetworkManager = {
serviceConfig.RuntimeDirectory = "NetworkManager"; #< tells systemd to create /run/NetworkManager
# serviceConfig.StateDirectory = "NetworkManager"; #< tells systemd to create /var/lib/NetworkManager
serviceConfig.User = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.Group = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.AmbientCapabilities = [
# "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE"
"CAP_NET_ADMIN"
"CAP_NET_RAW" #< required, else `libndp: ndp_sock_open: Failed to create ICMP6 socket.`
"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE" #< this *does* seem to be necessary, though i don't understand why. DHCP?
# "CAP_SYS_MODULE"
# "CAP_AUDIT_WRITE" #< allow writing to the audit log (optional)
# "CAP_KILL"
];
serviceConfig.LockPersonality = true;
serviceConfig.NoNewPrivileges = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateDevices = true; # remount /dev with just the basics, syscall filter to block @raw-io
serviceConfig.PrivateIPC = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateTmp = true;
# serviceConfig.PrivateUsers = true; #< BREAKS NetworkManager (presumably, it causes a new user namespace, breaking CAP_NET_ADMIN & others). "platform-linux: do-change-link[3]: failure 1 (Operation not permitted)"
serviceConfig.ProtectClock = true; # syscall filter to prevent changing the RTC
serviceConfig.ProtectControlGroups = true;
serviceConfig.ProtectHome = true; # makes empty: /home, /root, /run/user
serviceConfig.ProtectHostname = true; # probably not upstreamable: prevents changing hostname
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelLogs = true; # disable /proc/kmsg, /dev/kmsg
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelModules = true; # syscall filter to prevent module calls (probably not upstreamable: NM will want to load modules like `ppp`)
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelTunables = true; # but NM might need to write /proc/sys/net/...
serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = "strict"; # makes read-only: all but /dev, /proc, /sys.
serviceConfig.RestrictAddressFamilies = [
"AF_INET"
"AF_INET6"
"AF_NETLINK" # breaks near DHCP without this
"AF_PACKET" # for DHCP
"AF_UNIX"
# AF_ALG ?
# AF_BLUETOOTH ?
# AF_BRIDGE ?
];
serviceConfig.RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
serviceConfig.SystemCallArchitectures = "native"; # prevents e.g. aarch64 syscalls in the event that the kernel is multi-architecture.
# from earlier `landlock` sandboxing, i know it needs these directories:
# - "/proc/net"
# - "/proc/sys/net"
# - "/run/NetworkManager"
# - "/run/systemd" # for trust-dns-nmhook
# - "/run/udev"
# - # "/run/wg-home.priv"
# - "/sys/class"
# - "/sys/devices"
# - "/var/lib/NetworkManager"
# - "/var/lib/trust-dns" #< for trust-dns-nmhook
# - "/run/systemd"
};
systemd.services.NetworkManager-wait-online = {
serviceConfig.User = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.Group = "networkmanager";
};
# fix NetworkManager-dispatcher to actually run as a daemon,
# and sandbox it a bit
systemd.services.NetworkManager-dispatcher = {
after = [ "trust-dns-localhost.service" ]; #< so that /var/lib/trust-dns will exist
# serviceConfig.ExecStart = [
# "" # first blank line is to clear the upstream `ExecStart` field.
# "${cfg.package}/libexec/nm-dispatcher --persist" # --persist is needed for it to actually run as a daemon
# ];
# serviceConfig.Restart = "always";
# serviceConfig.RestartSec = "1s";
# serviceConfig.DynamicUser = true; #< not possible, else we lose group perms (so can't write to `trust-dns`'s files in the nm hook)
serviceConfig.User = "networkmanager"; # TODO: should arguably use `DynamicUser`
serviceConfig.Group = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.LockPersonality = true;
serviceConfig.NoNewPrivileges = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateDevices = true; # remount /dev with just the basics, syscall filter to block @raw-io
serviceConfig.PrivateIPC = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateTmp = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateUsers = true;
serviceConfig.ProtectClock = true; # syscall filter to prevent changing the RTC
serviceConfig.ProtectControlGroups = true;
serviceConfig.ProtectHome = true; # makes empty: /home, /root, /run/user
serviceConfig.ProtectHostname = true; # probably not upstreamable: prevents changing hostname
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelLogs = true; # disable /proc/kmsg, /dev/kmsg
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelModules = true; # syscall filter to prevent module calls
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelTunables = true;
serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = "full"; # makes read-only: /boot, /etc/, /usr. `strict` isn't possible due to trust-dns hook
serviceConfig.RestrictAddressFamilies = [
"AF_UNIX" # required, probably for dbus or systemd connectivity
];
serviceConfig.RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
serviceConfig.SystemCallArchitectures = "native"; # prevents e.g. aarch64 syscalls in the event that the kernel is multi-architecture.
};
# harden wpa_supplicant (used by NetworkManager)
systemd.services.wpa_supplicant = {
serviceConfig.User = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.Group = "networkmanager";
serviceConfig.AmbientCapabilities = [
"CAP_NET_ADMIN"
"CAP_NET_RAW"
];
serviceConfig.LockPersonality = true;
serviceConfig.NoNewPrivileges = true;
# serviceConfig.PrivateDevices = true; # untried, not likely to work. remount /dev with just the basics, syscall filter to block @raw-io
serviceConfig.PrivateIPC = true;
serviceConfig.PrivateTmp = true;
# serviceConfig.PrivateUsers = true; #< untried, not likely to work
serviceConfig.ProtectClock = true; # syscall filter to prevent changing the RTC
serviceConfig.ProtectControlGroups = true;
serviceConfig.ProtectHome = true; # makes empty: /home, /root, /run/user
serviceConfig.ProtectHostname = true; # prevents changing hostname
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelLogs = true; # disable /proc/kmsg, /dev/kmsg
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelModules = true; # syscall filter to prevent module calls
serviceConfig.ProtectKernelTunables = true; #< N.B.: i think this makes certain /proc writes fail
serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = "strict"; # makes read-only: all but /dev, /proc, /sys.
serviceConfig.RestrictAddressFamilies = [
"AF_INET" #< required
"AF_INET6"
"AF_NETLINK" #< required
"AF_PACKET" #< required
"AF_UNIX" #< required (wpa_supplicant wants to use dbus)
];
serviceConfig.RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
serviceConfig.SystemCallArchitectures = "native"; # prevents e.g. aarch64 syscalls in the event that the kernel is multi-architecture.
# from earlier `landlock` sandboxing, i know it needs only these paths:
# - "/dev/net"
# - "/dev/rfkill"
# - "/proc/sys/net"
# - "/sys/class/net"
# - "/sys/devices"
# - "/run/systemd"
};
networking.networkmanager.settings = {
# keyfile.path = where networkmanager should look for connection credentials
keyfile.path = "/var/lib/NetworkManager/system-connections";
# wifi.backend = "wpa_supplicant"; #< default
# wifi.scan-rand-mac-address = true; #< default
# logging.audit = false; #< default
logging.level = "INFO";
# main.dhcp = "internal"; #< default
main.dns = if config.services.resolved.enable then
"systemd-resolved"
else if config.sane.services.trust-dns.enable && config.sane.services.trust-dns.asSystemResolver then
"none"
else
"internal"
;
main.systemd-resolved = false;
};
environment.etc."NetworkManager/system-connections".source = "/var/lib/NetworkManager/system-connections";
# the default backend is "wpa_supplicant".
# wpa_supplicant reliably picks weak APs to connect to.
# see: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/-/issues/474>
# iwd is an alternative that shouldn't have this problem
# docs:
# - <https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Iwd>
# - <https://iwd.wiki.kernel.org/networkmanager>
# - `man iwd.config` for global config
# - `man iwd.network` for per-SSID config
# use `iwctl` to control
# networking.networkmanager.wifi.backend = "iwd";
# networking.wireless.iwd.enable = true;
# networking.wireless.iwd.settings = {
# # auto-connect to a stronger network if signal drops below this value
# # bedroom -> bedroom connection is -35 to -40 dBm
# # bedroom -> living room connection is -60 dBm
# General.RoamThreshold = "-52"; # default -70
# General.RoamThreshold5G = "-52"; # default -76
# };
# allow networkmanager to control systemd-resolved,
# which it needs to do to apply new DNS settings when using systemd-resolved.
security.polkit.extraConfig = ''
polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
if (subject.isInGroup("networkmanager") && action.id.indexOf("org.freedesktop.resolve1.") == 0) {
return polkit.Result.YES;
}
});
'';
users.users.networkmanager = {
isSystemUser = true;
group = "networkmanager";
extraGroups = [ "trust-dns" ];
};
# there is, unfortunately, no proper interface by which to plumb wpa_supplicant into the NixOS service, except by overlay.
nixpkgs.overlays = [(self: super: {
wpa_supplicant = super.wpa_supplicant.overrideAttrs (upstream: {
# postPatch = (upstream.postPatch or "") + ''
# substituteInPlace wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf --replace-fail \
# 'user="root"' 'user="networkmanager"'
# '';
postInstall = (upstream.postInstall or "") + ''
substitute $out/share/dbus-1/system.d/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf \
$out/share/dbus-1/system.d/networkmanager-wpa_supplicant.conf \
--replace-fail 'user="root"' 'group="networkmanager"'
'';
postFixup = (upstream.postFixup or "") + ''
# remove unused services to avoid unexpected interactions
rm $out/etc/systemd/system/{wpa_supplicant-nl80211@,wpa_supplicant-wired@,wpa_supplicant@}.service
'';
});
})];
}