Follow RFC 42 by having a settings option that is
then converted into an unbound configuration file
instead of having an extraConfig option.
Existing options have been renamed or kept if
possible.
An enableRemoteAccess has been added. It sets remote-control setting to
true in unbound.conf which in turn enables the new wrapping of
unbound-control to access the server locally. Also includes options
'remoteAccessInterfaces' and 'remoteAccessPort' for remote access.
Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>
Fixes these two deprecation warnings, by moving away from these options
towards a simple listener configuration.
> The 'bind_address' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. The behaviour will default to true.
> The 'port' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. Please use 'listener' instead.
Fixes: #120860
It can still network, it can only access the ssl related files if ssl is
enabled.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for mosquitto.service: 1.1 OK 🙂
Until now, the `touch + chmod 600 + write` approach made it possible for
an unprivileged local user read the private key file, by opening
the file after the touch, before the read permissions are restricted.
This was only the case if `generatePrivateKeyFile = true` and the parent
directory of `privateKeyFile` already existed and was readable.
This commit fixes it by using `umask`, which ensures kernel-side that
the `touch` creates the file with the correct permissions atomically.
This commit also:
* Removes `mkdir --mode 0644 -p "${dirOf values.privateKeyFile}"`
because setting permissions `drw-r--r--` ("nobody can enter that dir")
is awkward. `drwx------` would perhaps make sense, like for `.ssh`.
However, setting the permissions on the private key file is enough,
and likely better, because `privateKeyFile` is about that file
specifically and no docs suggest that there's something special
about its parent dir.
* Removes the `chmod 0400 "${values.privateKeyFile}"`
because there isn't really a point in removing write access from
the owner of the private key.
The last bits to prevent babeld from running unprivileged was its
kernel_setup_interface routine, that wants to set per interface
rp_filter. This behaviour has been disabled in a patch that has been
submitted upstream at https://github.com/jech/babeld/pull/68 and reuses
the skip-kernel-setup config option.
→ Overall exposure level for babeld.service: 1.7 OK 🙂
Upstream repositories do no longer exists. There has been no release in
a while. - Not a good combination for a network daemon running as root
in C that parses network packets...
As the only consequence of isSystemUser is that if the uid is null then
it's allocated below 500, if a user has uid = something below 500 then
we don't require isSystemUser to be set.
Motivation: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/112647
The haskellPackages.spacecookie derivation also includes a library and
thus a lot of propagated haskell dependencies. The top-level attribute
uses haskell.lib.justStaticExecutables and therefore only the
executable. This should reduce the runtime closure users have to
download considerably if they only want the server.
* Move `hostname` and `root` into a settings submodule with a freeform
type, allowing users to also use options not known to the NixOS
service. Compatibility with a warning for the renamed options is also
trivial to achieve.
* `port` stays where it is as we don't actually use the `port` option of
spacecookie to set up the socket, but only to inform spacecookie about
the port we have set in the `systemd.socket` file, this makes more
sense. Additionally the configuration of the listening port and
address change in the next spacecookie release — we can dodge this
issue altogether by doing our own thing, but I'm interested to hear
opinions on this.
To ensure that this is not misconfigured, we add an assertion for
the port option.
* Add an assertion for `user` in settings which has no effect the way
we are starting spacecookie as it wouldn't be able to call setuid.
The message also explains how a specific user can be used with
spacecookie if desired.
This configuration option reflects a new feature from the unreleased
spacecookie version allowing to customize the address spacecookie will
listen on (e. g. "::1" to bind on link-local addresses only). We will
not use this feature in the future, since the configuration option of
spacecookie naturally only has an effect if we don't use socket
activation (and spacecookie sets up its own socket), but having the same
functionality in the service seems like a good idea.
We can luckily emulate this behavior with socket activation as well.
This allows to change the derivation to use for the spacecookie server
binary. We probably should also use justStaticExecutables by default to
reduce the runtime closure of the service.
