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conf, passt, tap: Open socket and PID files before switching UID/GID

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Otherwise, if the user runs us as root, and gives us paths that are
only accessible by root, we'll fail to open them, which might in turn
encourage users to change permissions or ownerships: definitely a bad
idea in terms of security.

Reported-by: Minxi Hou <mhou@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Stefano Brivio
2024-05-22 20:18:19 +02:00
parent ba23b05545
commit c9b2413465
5 changed files with 28 additions and 11 deletions
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10
passt.c
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@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ void exit_handler(int signal)
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int nfds, i, devnull_fd = -1, pidfile_fd;
struct epoll_event events[EPOLL_EVENTS];
char *log_name, argv0[PATH_MAX], *name;
int nfds, i, devnull_fd = -1;
struct ctx c = { 0 };
struct rlimit limit;
struct timespec now;
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
isolate_initial();
c.pasta_netns_fd = c.fd_tap = -1;
c.pasta_netns_fd = c.fd_tap = c.pidfile_fd = -1;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
@@ -299,8 +299,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
pidfile_fd = pidfile_open(c.pid_file);
if (isolate_prefork(&c))
die("Failed to sandbox process, exiting");
@@ -308,9 +306,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
__openlog(log_name, 0, LOG_DAEMON);
if (!c.foreground)
__daemon(pidfile_fd, devnull_fd);
__daemon(c.pidfile_fd, devnull_fd);
else
pidfile_write(pidfile_fd, getpid());
pidfile_write(c.pidfile_fd, getpid());
if (pasta_child_pid)
kill(pasta_child_pid, SIGUSR1);