modules/programs: don't expose *all* of /run/secrets/home to every program
this was actually causing a lot of bwrap errors because that directory's not user-readable turns out any program which already uses programs.xyz.secrets gets the /run/secrets mounts for free via symlink following
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@@ -81,13 +81,11 @@ let
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"/etc" #< especially for /etc/profiles/per-user/$USER/bin
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"/run/current-system" #< for basics like `ls`, and all this program's `suggestedPrograms` (/run/current-system/sw/bin)
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"/run/wrappers" #< SUID wrappers, in this case so that firejail can be re-entrant
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# "/bin/sh" #< to allow `firejail --join=...` (doesn't work)
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"/run/wrappers" #< SUID wrappers, in this case so that firejail can be re-entrant. TODO: remove!
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"/run/systemd/resolve" #< to allow reading /etc/resolv.conf, which ultimately symlinks here
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# /run/opengl-driver is a symlink into /nix/store; needed by e.g. mpv
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"/run/opengl-driver"
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"/run/opengl-driver-32" #< XXX: doesn't exist on aarch64?
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"/run/secrets/home" #< TODO: this could be restricted per-app based on the HOME paths they need
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"/usr/bin/env"
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] ++ lib.optionals (builtins.elem "system" sandbox.whitelistDbus) [ "/run/dbus/system_bus_socket" ]
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++ sandbox.extraPaths ++ fullHomePaths ++ fullRuntimePaths;
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