sanebox: forward argv0
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@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
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buildPackages,
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file,
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gnugrep,
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makeBinaryWrapper,
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gnused,
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makeWrapper,
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runCommandLocal,
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runtimeShell,
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sanebox,
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@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ let
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# the ordering here is specific: inject our deps BEFORE the unwrapped program's
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# so that the unwrapped's take precendence and we limit interference (e.g. makeWrapper impl)
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fakeSaneSandboxed
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makeBinaryWrapper
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gnugrep
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makeWrapper
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] ++ (unwrapped.nativeBuildInputs or []);
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disallowedReferences = (unwrapped.disallowedReferences or []) ++ [
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# the fake sandbox gates itself behind SANEBOX_DISABLE, so if it did end up deployed
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@@ -73,15 +75,14 @@ let
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# my programs refer to sanebox by name, not path, which triggers an over-eager assertion in nixpkgs (so, mask that)
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:
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}
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makeDocumentedCWrapper() {
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# this is identical to nixpkgs' implementation, only replace execv with execvp, the latter which looks for the executable on PATH.
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local src docs
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src=$(makeCWrapper "$@")
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src="''${src/return execv(/return execvp(}"
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docs=$(docstring "$@")
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printf '%s\n\n' "$src"
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printf '%s\n' "$docs"
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}
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# makeDocumentedCWrapper() {
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# # this is identical to nixpkgs' implementation, only replace execv with execvp, the latter which looks for the executable on PATH.
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# local src=$(makeCWrapper "$@")
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# src="''${src/return execv(/return execvp(}"
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# local docs=$(docstring "$@")
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# printf '%s\n\n' "$src"
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# printf '%s\n' "$docs"
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# }
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sandboxWrap() {
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local _dir="$1"
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@@ -90,8 +91,7 @@ let
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# N.B.: unlike stock `wrapProgram`, we place the unwrapped binary in a subdirectory and *preserve its name*.
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# the upside of this is that for applications which read "$0" to decide what to do (e.g. busybox, git)
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# they work as expected without any special hacks.
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# if desired, makeWrapper-style naming could be achieved by leveraging `exec -a <original_name>`
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# or `make-wrapper --inherit-argv0`
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# though even so, the sandboxer still tries to preserve the $0 which it was invoked under
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mkdir -p "$_dir/.sandboxed"
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if [[ "$(readlink $_dir/$_name)" =~ ^\.\./ ]]; then
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# relative links which ascend a directory (into a non-bin/ directory)
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@@ -101,7 +101,13 @@ let
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else
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mv "$_dir/$_name" "$_dir/.sandboxed/"
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fi
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makeBinaryWrapper ${sanebox'} "$_dir/$_name" --suffix PATH : /run/current-system/sw/libexec/sanebox ${lib.escapeShellArgs (lib.flatten (builtins.map (f: [ "--add-flags" f ]) extraSandboxArgs))} --add-flags "$_dir/.sandboxed/$_name"
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makeShellWrapper ${sanebox'} "$_dir/$_name" --suffix PATH : /run/current-system/sw/libexec/sanebox \
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${lib.escapeShellArgs (lib.flatten (builtins.map (f: [ "--add-flags" f ]) extraSandboxArgs))} \
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--add-flags "$_dir/.sandboxed/$_name"
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# `exec`ing a script with an interpreter will smash $0. instead, source it to preserve $0:
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# - <https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/150841#issuecomment-995589961>
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substituteInPlace "$_dir/$_name" \
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--replace-fail 'exec ' 'source '
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}
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crawlAndWrap() {
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@@ -94,6 +94,14 @@ netGateway=default
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dns=()
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# VAR -> VALUE map of environment variables to add to the sandboxed program's environment
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declare -A portalEnv
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argv0=
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case "${0:-8}" in
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("sanebox"|"/sanebox")
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;;
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(*)
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argv0="$0"
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;;
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esac
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# arguments to forward onto a specific backend (if that backend is active)
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bwrapArgs=()
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@@ -501,6 +509,7 @@ parseArgs() {
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# this lets the user do things like `mpv --sanebox-replace-cli sh` to enter a shell
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# with the sandbox that `mpv` would see.
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parseArgsExtra=()
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argv0=
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;;
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(--sanebox-disable)
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isDisable=1
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@@ -754,7 +763,8 @@ bwrapGetCli() {
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done
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cliArgs=(
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"$_bwrap" \
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"$_bwrap"
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--argv0 "$argv0"
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"${bwrapUnshareCgroup[@]}"
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"${bwrapUnshareIpc[@]}"
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"${bwrapUnshareNet[@]}"
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@@ -921,7 +931,7 @@ capshonlyGetCli() {
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locate _capsh "capsh" "$CAPSH_FALLBACK"
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locate _env "env" "$ENV_FALLBACK"
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local envArgs=()
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local envArgs=(-a "$argv0")
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for envName in "${!portalEnv[@]}"; do
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envArgs+=("$envName=${portalEnv[$envName]}")
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done
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@@ -984,7 +994,7 @@ pastaonlyIngestCapability() {
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pastaonlyGetCli() {
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cliArgs=(
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"/bin/sh" "-c"
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"$pastaNetSetup exec"' "$0" "$@"'
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"$pastaNetSetup exec"' "$argv0" "$@"'
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"${cliArgs[@]}"
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)
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locate _pasta "pasta" "$PASTA_FALLBACK"
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@@ -1032,7 +1042,7 @@ noneIngestCapability() {
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:
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}
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noneGetCli() {
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:
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cliArgs=(-a "$argv0" "${cliArgs[@]}")
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}
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@@ -1138,6 +1148,9 @@ parseArgsAndEnvironment() {
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parseArgs "$@"
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cliArgs+=("${parseArgsExtra[@]}")
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if [ -z "$argv0" ]; then
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argv0=${cliArgs[0]}
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fi
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if [ -n "$SANEBOX_APPEND" ]; then
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parseArgs $SANEBOX_APPEND
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@@ -1175,6 +1188,9 @@ ingestForBackend() {
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## TOPLEVEL EXECUTION
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# no code evaluated before this point should be dependent on user args / environment.
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# TODO: use `set -e`, only i'm using `return 1` in places for control flow.
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set +e
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parseArgsAndEnvironment "$@"
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# variables meant to be inherited
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